Digital violence against women and girls is a form of gender-based violence and a key challenge for gender equality today. It ranges from image-based sexualized violence and deepfakes to cyberstalking and hate speech, as well as doxing and coordinated attacks in misogynist online environments. Current data shows a drastic increase in such offenses, while less than five percent of these crimes are reported. Victims often face significant barriers to access justice, which hinders enforcement of law. As a result, digital violence remains largely invisible and is rarely prosecuted. Nonetheless, it has significant psychological, social, and professional consequences for victims; very often, it leads to their withdrawal from the digital sphere and social spaces in general.
Germany is obligated, under international and European law, to effectively prevent, prosecute, and sanction gender-based violence in the digital sphere. Standards are set by CEDAW, the ECHR and the Istanbul Convention, the EU Digital Services Act, and the Directive 2024 on Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. They all specify what the German Basic Law, as the national constitution, explicitly demands: the actual implementation of equality and an elimination of existing disadvantages, as stipulated in Article 3, Paragraph 2 Basic Law, that disproportionately disadvantage women.
Against this backdrop, three priorities for action emerge:
1. Consistent implementation of international and European standards, in particular the EU Directive on Protection against Violence against Women.
2. Development of a holistic concept of prevention, protection, and effective prosecution.
3. Regular, systematic, and intersectionally analysed data collection.
Digital violence against women and girls is a form of gender-based violence and a key challenge for gender equality today. It ranges from image-based sexualized violence and deepfakes to cyberstalking and hate speech, as well as doxing and coordinated attacks in misogynist online environments. Current data shows a drastic increase in such offenses, while less than five percent of these crimes are reported. Victims often face significant barriers to access justice, which hinders enforcement of law. As a result, digital violence remains largely invisible and is rarely prosecuted. Nonetheless, it has significant psychological, social, and professional consequences for victims; very often, it leads to their withdrawal from the digital sphere and social spaces in general.
Germany is obligated, under international and European law, to effectively prevent, prosecute, and sanction gender-based violence in the digital sphere. Standards are set by CEDAW, the ECHR and the Istanbul Convention, the EU Digital Services Act, and the Directive 2024 on Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. They all specify what the German Basic Law, as the national constitution, explicitly demands: the actual implementation of equality and an elimination of existing disadvantages, as stipulated in Article 3, Paragraph 2 Basic Law, that disproportionately disadvantage women.
Against this backdrop, three priorities for action emerge:
1. Consistent implementation of international and European standards, in particular the EU Directive on Protection against Violence against Women.
2. Development of a holistic concept of prevention, protection, and effective prosecution.
3. Regular, systematic, and intersectionally analysed data collection.
A. Introduction
This policy paper by the German Association of Women Lawyers (djb) provides an overview of the problems of access to justice in cases of digital violence and, in light of Germany's obligations under EU, European and global international law, highlights the continuing need for action. The djb has repeatedly pointed out implementation deficits and proposed means to effectively address digital violence.[1]In 2026, the djb’s event in cooperation with the German Federal Ministry of Education, Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMBFSJ), "Access to Justice in Cases of Digital Violence. Countering the Manosphere," held on the occasion of the 70th Commission on the Status of Women from March 9 to 20, 2026, underscores the topicality and relevance of this issue.
Digital violence against women and girls is not only an increasingly widespread form of violence. It also produces a structural inequality and hinders access to justice. Many forms of digital violence are not isolated incidents but rather the continuation of patriarchal mechanisms of control and intimidation in the digital sphere.[2]There is a significant increase in digital violence. German authorities registered, in 2024, 18,224 female victims[3], which is an increase of 110.6% within five years.[4] Studies of unreported cases, such as those conducted by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMBFSFJ), the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), and the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), show that less than five percent of incidents of digital violence are ever reported.[5]
Even though more legislation, such as the EU Directive on Protection against Violence against Women,[6] has been enacted in recent years to address digital violence, there is a lack of sufficient understanding of the various forms and the far-reaching serious consequences for those affected. Such an understanding is indispensable for ensuring equality, and to fully and effectively implement Germany's obligations under international and European law. It is even more timely because it has a particular impact on access to justice.
Against this backdrop, the following section first defines gender-specific digital violence and identifies various manifestations, particularly in the so-called manosphere. It then presents the international and European legal framework of protection against digital violence and the resulting obligations of the state. This allows for the identification of implementation deficits and gaps of protection against digital violence in German law. Based on this, the djb proposes measures to achieve truly effective protection for victims against all forms of digital violence.
B. Manifestations of Digital Violence
I. Forms of Digital Gender-Based Violence
Digital violence encompasses a multitude of acts committed by using digital technologies, especially social media, smartphones, and increasingly, artificial intelligence. It is not a single, uniform offense, but rather a broad spectrum of activities.[7]
In particular, there is image-based sexualized violence, as in the non-consensual appropriation, creation, or production of intimate images, their distribution or use without consent, and the threat of publication.[8] Here, so-called deepfakes, in which deceptively realistic sexualized images or videos are generated using artificial intelligence to humiliate, blackmail, or publicly discredit victims, are an increasingly relevant form of violence.[9]
As such, digital violence can have serious consequences for the psychological and social lives of those affected. It is also frequently linked to violence in intimate relationships.[10]
A special form is digitized violence, as the distribution of images and videos of actual sexual assaults or rapes, and thus the subsequent digital amplification of physical violence.[11]
II. Gender-Specific Dimension and Intersectionality
Data clearly shows that digital violence is very often sexual, and gender-specific.[12] Current figures from the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) show that women are significantly more frequently affected than men, in a ratio of 61.2% to 38.8%[13]. Digital violence builds upon patriarchal power structures. It is often characterized by the sexualization and objectification of female bodies, as well as by a social stigmatization of those affected. Digital violence therefore reproduces gendered relations of power and control in the virtual space, and it serves as an extension and reinforcement of structural inequalities.
Individuals facing multiple forms of discrimination are particularly affected, their vulnerability arising from the interplay of various forms of discrimination, such as those related to their profession—namely targeting female politicians and other public figures—, and in conjunction with racism, queerphobia, and ableism. However, there is no disaggregated data collection in Germany, and thus no precise recording of intersectional vulnerabilities. Thus, specific risk situations often remain invisible, which hinders the development of targeted protection and prevention measures, and again, negatively impacts access to justice.
III. The Manosphere
The so-called manosphere is becoming increasingly relevant to the spread of digital gender-based violence.[14] It consists of loosely connected online communities in which misogynistic narratives are disseminated and traditional gender roles are reinforced, particularly those characterized by aggressive masculinity and subordinate femininity. These spaces often also function as sites of political radicalization within the authoritarian spectrum and contribute to the normalization of misogynistic ideologies. In these digital environments, antifeminist interpretations are reinforced, equality policies are delegitimized, and women are categorically constructed as a threat to male identity. The narratives disseminated there frequently tap into societal dynamics of polarization and stabilize notions of male entitlement and control.[15]
The manosphere forcefully contributes to the ideological foundation of gender-based violence by normalizing misogyny. In its extreme forms, such digital spaces of radicalization can become fertile ground for the escalation of violence.[16
C. International and European Legal Framework
I. UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women[17] (CEDAW) does not explicitly mention digital violence, but the responsible CEDAW Committee clarified early on that any form of gender-based violence against women constitutes discrimination within the meaning of Article 1 CEDAW.[18] This includes any form of violence directed against women because they are women or that disproportionately affects them. In its General Recommendation No. 35 (2017), the Committee emphasized that such violence occurs in all areas of life – including in technologically mediated and digital spaces. It explicitly refers to online violence and clarifies that this can be perpetrated by states as well as by private or non-state actors, even extraterritorially.[19]
Therefore, gender-based violence against women in the digital sphere is to be considered discrimination within the meaning of Article 1 CEDAW and triggers the obligations stipulated in Article 2 of the Convention. According to this article, States Parties must pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, policies to eliminate discrimination against women, including gender-based violence against women.[20] This includes regulating the conduct of private actors and enabling effective legal protection.[21] Among other things, the Committee recommends removing obstacles to the collection of evidence of violations of women's rights committed online and through the use of information and communication technologies and new social media.[22]
II. UN Convention on Cybercrime
Furthermore, the UN Convention on Cybercrime[23] obliges states parties to criminalize necessary measures against the sale, dissemination, transmission, publication, or other making available of an intimate image of a person by means of an information and communication technology system without the consent of the person depicted, provided that such acts were committed intentionally and unlawfully (Art. 16 (1)). The Convention has not yet entered into force; this will occur 90 days after forty states have ratified the instrument.[24]
III. European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights[25] (ECHR) does not contain an explicit provision on digital violence. However, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) interprets the Convention dynamically, specifically in light of technological developments, according to the living instrument doctrine.[26][27]Thus, digital violence is covered by the norms that oblige states to protect against violence.
Notably, the ECHR is not limited to defensive rights of the individual against the state, but also obligates the contracting states to protect private individuals from a violation of their rights by private parties.[28] Namely, a Convention right is violated when a state fails to fulfill this duty of protection.[29]According to the case law of the ECtHR with regard to violence, Articles 2, 3, and 8 of the ECHR, the right to life, prohibition of torture, and right to privacy, impose procedural obligations on national authorities: first, to establish a legislative framework; second, to implement sufficient protective measures; and third, to initiate criminal investigations.[30]
The Court has recognized such obligations in several cases of digital violence. In Buturugă v. Romania, the Court held, for the first time, that digital violence in the form of cyberbullying constitutes an aspect of domestic violence and violates Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. In the 2021 case of Russia No. 2, the Court decided that inaction of authorities in the face of the applicant's husband's repeated creation of fake profiles in her name, the publication of intimate photos, tracking of her movements via GPS trackers, and death threats via social media constituted a violation of Article 8.[31]In the 2024 case of M.Ș.D. v. Romania, the Court held that the dissemination of revenge pornography, thus intimate photos and/or videos of a former intimate partner against their will, also gives rise to a duty of protection, in that there must be a legislative framework and effective criminal investigations.[32]
Overall, the ECtHR thus recognizes digital violence as a form of violence against women and girls closely linked to physical violence and establishes a duty of protection for states.[33]
IV. Istanbul Convention
The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence[34], the Istanbul Convention, is the most comprehensive international legal instrument for combating gender-based violence in Europe to date. The Istanbul Convention understands violence against women as gender-based violence that is structurally embedded in societal power relations and disproportionately affects women because of their gender.[35] In particular, the Convention defines violence realistically by explicitly covering more than physical violence by including psychological, sexual, and economic forms of violence as well.[36] The Convention thus provides a normative framework of central importance also for digital manifestations of gender-based violence.
In addition, the Istanbul Convention pursues a holistic approach: It obliges contracting states not only to combat violence against women, but also to address the broader spectrum of human rights.[37] The state's duty of due diligence, in Article 5, is particularly important. According to it, state parties must effectively prevent, investigate, sanction, and redress gender-based violence by private individuals, which is especially relevant in the digital context, because gender-based violence is frequently perpetrated by private users of digital platforms.[38]
In further detailing Article 5, Article 33 obliges states parties to criminalize intentional acts that cause serious psychological harm through coercion or threats. Art. 33 is thus an important point of reference to address digital violence where victims are often not physically injured but subjected to significant psychological distress by continued surveillance, threats, and public defamation.[39]
Furthermore, Article 34 obligates states parties to criminalize intentional repeated stalking if it causes serious fear. Here, the Convention does not differentiate between analogous and digital forms of harassment, but the Group of Experts on the Implementation of the Istanbul Convention (GREVIO) emphasizes that harassment can also occur using digital communication tools.[40] Digital surveillance, repeated contact via communication platforms, or the systematic monitoring of online activities thus falls within the scope of the Convention.
In addition, Article 40 obliges states to sanction sexual harassment. This occurs today particularly in social media and digital spaces, with specific dynamics of blurring boundaries and intensification.
According to Article 17, state parties are also obligated to encourage the private sector, especially information and communication technology companies, to participate in the prevention of violence against women. This acknowledges that digital platforms are not only sites of crime but, as regulatory actors, must be included in preventive strategies.[41]
However, digital violence should not be treated solely as a criminal law issue. There are additional prevention and protection obligations that are also applicable to the digital sphere. In particular, states must guarantee sufficient access to legal counsel.[42] Also Article 11 obliges states to collect detailed data on gender-based violence.
Overall, the Istanbul Convention thus provides an important framework for making digital gender-based violence visible, classifying it legally, and effectively combating it.
V. European Union
1. EU Directive on Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence
The EU Directive on Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence[43] is the first such comprehensive EU legal act to create a uniform legal framework across the European Union. The Directive contains provisions addressing criminal law, access to justice, victim protection, victim assistance, prevention and intervention, as well as coordination and cooperation.
Here as well, violence against women is realistically defined. According to Article 2(a), it includes, in particular, acts that cause or may cause physical, sexual, psychological, or economic harm or suffering.
The Directive then lists acts of violence, including those with a digital component, that member states must criminalize. Among them are the distribution of intimate or sexual images or videos, as well as the creation and distribution of manipulated images, including deepfakes (Article 5), cyberstalking (Article 6), cyberbullying (Article 7), and incitement to violence or hatred against a gender-defined group or individual members online (Article 8).
Furthermore, Article 23 imposes a state obligation to ensure that content that has entered the internet in a criminally relevant manner is deleted or that the corresponding accounts are blocked. Article 11 requires member states to ensure that aggravating circumstances can be taken into account in determining the sentence for offenses in Articles 3 to 8, including sexual orientation and gender.
Article 34 then stipulates the obligation to implement preventive measures. Paragraph 8 explicitly addresses measures against digital violence, such as the provision of digital skills training. It is worth noting that Article 2(g) of the Directive stipulates that “dependent persons,” including, for example, a victim’s children, should receive the same protective measures as the victims themselves.[44]
Furthermore, Article 12(3) stipulates that judicial jurisdiction must be established in relation to the victim, because online content is accessed from a state's territory, regardless of where the hosting service is located or in which country the material was uploaded. This serves to prevent jurisdictional gaps regarding cybercrime.
2. Digital Services Act
The Digital Services Act (DSA)[45]is the central regulation governing all online services operating in the European Union. The DSA aims to make digital spaces safer, protect fundamental rights, and reduce systemic risks such as hate speech, disinformation, and gender-based violence. To this end, the DSA regulates digital rights of users on online platforms. These include transparency regarding the removal of content, and options for challenging content moderation decisions (Article 20), easy reporting of illegal content (Article 16), and improved protection for minors (Article 28).
Large online platforms in particular must identify and analyze widespread risks. According to Article 34, this includes gender-based violence, as well as the protection of minors and physical and mental well-being. If these risks are identified, the platform operator is obligated, under Article 35, to mitigate them through appropriate measures.
3. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) contains provisions for the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data in the European Union. In December 2025, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in the Russmedia Digital[46] case that platforms can be directly sued to have personal data deleted from the internet. Providers must design their digital services in such a way that risks are limited, at least for particularly sensitive data.
D. National Legal Framework in Germany
I. Criminal Law
Criminal law In Germany (StGB) addresses offences such as insult (§ 185 StGB), threat (§ 241 StGB), stalking (§ 238 StGB), pornography (§§ 184 ff. StGB), a violation of the highly personal sphere of life (§ 201a StGB) and of the right to one's own image (§ 33 KUG). In 2021, to protect against gender-based violence, the legislature also expanded the offense of threats to include threats of unlawful acts against sexual self-determination (§ 241 para. 1 StGB).
Minors are to be protected from sexually explicit depictions in digital content through the pornography offenses in §§ 184b and 184c StGB. The norm covers distribution and making content publicly available, as well as creating content that depicts an actual event (real-life content), making such content accessible to or obtaining possession of it from others, and accessing and obtaining suchcontent for oneself. Furthermore, § 201a para 3 StGB prohibits creating or offering an image depicting a minor naked in order to provide it to a third party for payment (No. 1) or obtaining such an image for oneself or a third party for payment (No. 2). However, there is a regulatory gap: There is no prohibition against manipulating (neutral) image material for the purpose of creating a deepfake.
There is no comparably comprehensive regulation to protect adults. Image-based sexualized violence against adults is currently addressed rather haphazardly and partially in various regulatory frameworks.
II. Civil Law
The civil law framework against image-based violence distinguishes between making images publicly accessible and other forms of unauthorized use (creation, possession, private distribution, and manipulation).
Distributing or publicly displaying images without consent in which the person concerned is recognizably depicted is covered by § 823 para 2 in conjunction with §§ 22 and 23 of the German Copyright Act (KUG) and—unless a justification under § 23 para 1 KUG applies—constitutes a violation of the right to one's own image. In the case of other forms of unauthorized use, however, the unlawfulness of the infringement of the general right of personality is not indicated by § 823 para 2 of the German Civil Code (BGB), so a balancing of the conflicting interests must be carried out in each individual case according to § 823 para 1 BGB.[47] The same applies to cases of non-image-based violence that infringe on privacy.
In civil law, deepfakes are considered visual lies, the dissemination and public display of which generally requires consent. The above also applies here. However, the classification as a pictorial lie may be waived if deepfakes are labelled as such. This also results in a gap in protection. What remains, however, is a violation of personal rights through manipulation. In the case of sexualized deepfakes, this regularly concerns the sphere of intimacy.
Civil law consequences of violations primarily include claims for injunctive relief and removal (deletion). Claims for damages can generally only be asserted in cases of commercial use. Monetary compensation is only considered in cases of serious infringement of personal rights.
To pursue these civil claims, corresponding rights to information are required against anonymous individuals. However, the right to information about existing subscriber data under § 21 para 2 of the Telecommunications and Digital Services Act (TDDDG) against providers of digital services currently only applies if the content fulfills the criminal offenses specified in § 21 para 2 or if absolutely protected rights are violated by unlawful audiovisual content.
Furthermore, other gaps in protection exist: The disclosure of residential addresses enables various forms of violence – from unwanted online orders and the sending of threatening letters to stalking or even physical violence at home. This is not adequately addressed in procedural law, the legal notice requirement, or registration law.
In procedural terms, courts currently consider the disclosure of c/o addresses permissible only in rare exceptional cases, even in proceedings concerning (digital) violence. The resulting risk of address disclosure can deter victims from actually seeking legal recourse. Noch weitergehend zwingt die Impressumspflichtpotenziell Betroffene von digitaler Gewalt zur Offenbarung von Adressdaten im Internet.
Going even further, the legal notice requirement forces potential victims of digital violence to disclose their address data online. According to Section 5 of the Digital Services Act, this applies to all operators of websites or social media profiles that are not purely private, and according to Section 18 of the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty, to providers of journalistic and editorial content. This can be particularly discouraging for freelancers, self-employed individuals, and politically active citizens, discouraging them from even having a voice in the digital sphere.
The current regulations regarding registration information are also problematic. On the one hand, an address is easily obtained from the residents' registration office (§§ 44, 45 Federal Registration Act), and on the other hand, the requirements for a registration block under § 51 Federal Registration Act are very high and are applied very inconsistently across Germany. This makes the vulnerability of potential victims to digital and analog violence dependent on the chance of where they live.
E. djb Recommendations
I. Closing Legal Protection Gaps
In Germany, criminal law protection against digital violence is currently incomplete and fragmented.[48] Protection against image-based sexualized violence, especially for adult victims, under the German Criminal Code (StGB) and the German Copyright Act (KUG) is inadequate, particularly regarding deepfakes. There is a need for unified set of regulations governing criminal offenses in criminal law against sexual crimes, criminalizing the unauthorized creation, use, dissemination, and manipulation of images depicting another adult naked or in a sexually explicit manner, with proportional penalties.[49]
So-called doxing, the unauthorized publication of private data belonging to third parties, which often occurs as an accompanying offense to the distribution or publication of sexually explicit personal images, also needs to be addressed by criminal law, as the existing provisions in the German Criminal Code (StGB) and the Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG) do not provide sufficient protection.[50] A separate, consistent, and comprehensive regulation is needed here.[51]
To enable better protection of victims, civil law is needed. In particular, there is a need for claims for injunctive relief and removal. Violations of personal rights below the threshold of criminal severity should at least trigger such claims. In balancing conflicting interests in cases of digital violence, the right to privacy must weigh heavily, in that it generally outweighs the interests of the producer or owner of (manipulated) images. In addition, it must be stipulated that a claim for deletion can also apply to sexualized images and deepfakes originally produced with consent if that consent is subsequently withdrawn.
To enable effective legal prosecution, the right to information under § 21 para 2 of the German Telemedia Act (TDDG) must also be extended to include the offenses under §§ 240, 253, and 202a of the German Criminal Code (StGB), as well as, where applicable, § 33 of the German Copyright Act (KUG) and § 42 of the German Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG), on publication of personal data.
Here, the djb specifically calls for the introduction of court-ordered account suspensions to effectively protect women from digital violence. Currently, neither national nor European legal frameworks provide for court-ordered account suspensions. But digital violence is often perpetrated by anonymous accounts. If there are no criminal investigations—which are frequently discontinued without result—there is no way to identify the account owner in order to bring civil action against that individual. It is necessary to close this protection gap. Court ordered account suspensions should then not be limited to anonymous accounts but also apply to accounts that repeatedly violate the rights of others. Since account suspension can constitute a significant infringement on freedom of expression, legislation must be designed to ensure proportionality.[52][53]
II. Improvement of Investigative and Procedural Structures
In cases of so-called hate speech in the digital sphere that constitutes the criminal offense of insult, § 194 of the German Criminal Code (StGB) should be amended to allow for more effective prosecution. This amendment should stipulate that a formal complaint from the victim is not required unless this conflicts with the victim's interests.[54]
The relevant criminal offenses for combating image-based sexualized violence should be structured as relative offenses requiring a formal complaint. The Guidelines for Criminal Proceedings (RiStBV) should clarify that a special public interest in the investigation should be assumed particularly when the depicted individuals cannot be identified. Furthermore, these offenses should be included in the list of offenses that can be prosecuted as private prosecutions under § 395 para 1 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO) to further safeguard the procedural rights of victims.[55]
In addition, there is a greater need for protection regarding the addresses of potential victims of digital violence. Parties to the proceedings, victims must be able to conceal their residential address, provided that enforcement is ensured by other means. To comply with legal notice requirements, intermediaries must be available. Registration offices may only release addresses with the consent of the person concerned or if the applicant has a particularly compelling interest.
Finally, police, prosecutors and courts are to be educated and trained to properly deal with forms and effects of digital violence. In this area, access to justice may only exist if victims of violence can rely on protection, support and a commitment to justice by all state actors.
III. Consistent Implementation of the EU Directive on Protection Against Violence 2024
Germany is obligated to implement the provisions of the EU Directive on Protection Against Violence by June 14, 2027. With regard to digital violence, action is required. For example, to fully implement Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of the Directive, a unified set of criminal offenses should be created in German law, to protect the right to sexual self-determination. To cover cyberstalking as required by Article 6, § 238 of the German Criminal Code (StGB) and the provisions of Chapter 15 of the StGB must be amended. Articles 7 and 8 of the Directive also require comprehensive reforms to the Criminal Code. In addition, Article 15(1) and (2) of the Directive mandate effective and swift investigation and prosecution of the offenses covered, as well as effectively securing evidence by the competent authorities. These must be equipped with the necessary expertise and provided with the necessary investigative tools, particularly in the emerging field of cyber violence. This, too, requires implementation.
IV. Stronger Platform Responsibility
It must be ensured that strong platform responsibility exists in practice. The DSA places great emphasis on self-responsibility in this regard; therefore, the legal act must be consistently implemented and further developed. For effective enforcement of the law, the introduction of class action lawsuits or representative standing, including anonymization options, is required, enabling victims of digital violence to be supported in asserting their rights. To ensure self-protection against hate attacks, legal notice requirements should be adjusted and an anonymized virtual space facilitated by state-run protection agencies should be provided.
V. Better Support and Protection for Victims
However, these measures are not enough to combat digital violence. A societal shift in thinking and an overcoming of patriarchal notions of gender are necessary. This urgently requires empirical research on the prevalence of digital violence, the victims and perpetrators, online radicalization, and the role algorithms play. Federal research funding can make a significant contribution to this.
Furthermore, a comprehensive strategy for combating digital gender-based violence is needed, including measures for prevention, victim protection, media literacy, and effective, easily accessible approaches to addressing digital violence in close social settings. Existing measures are inadequate:[56] counselling centres often lack sufficient or adequate staffing;[57] moreover, there are significant differences in expertise in dealing with digital violence among both counseling centers and law enforcement agencies.[58]
In order for Germany to fulfill its obligation to structurally address the digital dimension of gender-based violence, in line with the GREVIO recommendations on digital violence against women[59], resources are needed. This includes the sustainable expansion of counseling services, comprehensive, quality-assured training, and a strong network, including IT specialists, to provide effective support for victims.[60] Furthermore, capacities for prevention and skills development must be created for all relevant professional groups, as well as hotlines and crisis centers for victims of sexualized violence.[61]
Currently, access to specialized support services guaranteed under Article 22 of the Istanbul Convention is hampered by barriers.[62] Specialized counselling centres are confronted with digital violence more and more often.[63] To better reach younger people, a greater presence on social media is needed.[64] This requires additional resources and training for professionals.[65]
VI. Data Collection
The djb welcomes the collection of data on digital violence in accordance with the obligation under Article 11 of the Istanbul Convention, as outlined in the recent report and the dark figure study. However, gaps remain, particularly regarding intersectional discrimination. The situation report and dark figure study should also be conducted at regular intervals.[66] When analyzing the data, a lack of willingness to report crimes in this area and the resulting large number of unreported cases must be taken into account.[67]
F. Concluding Remarks and Outlook
Digital violence against women and girls is a key human rights and gender equality challenge today. With more digitalization, societal power relations are shifting into the virtual realm, where they are intensified, accelerated, and become more pervasive. Radicalized online environments such as the so-called manosphere normalize misogyny, delegitimize equality, and create spaces where intimidation, sexualized assault, and coordinated attacks against women become acceptable and commonplace. Here, access to justice determines whether victims receive protection, or are forced to withdraw not only from digital spaces.
Germany is obligated under international and European law to guarantee effective prevention, prosecution, and legal protection in the digital sphere as well. To date, legal protection is incomplete, because criminal offenses are applied sporadically, civil claims are difficult to enforce, platforms are insufficiently held accountable, and specialized support structures are lacking. For victims, this means high hurdles, lengthy procedures, and often secondary victimization. Access to justice is thus structurally limited.
What is needed is a coherent overall approach comprising clear legal regulations, consistent enforcement, specialized investigative structures, reliable data collection, and a strong advisory and support infrastructure. Digital violence is a global equality issue and requires coordinated action at all levels. Effective access to justice is not an add-on, but a prerequisite for digital participation and equality. The djb side event at the 70th session of the Commission on the Status of Women offers a forum to exchange practices, learning from one another, and further develop joint strategies.
[1] See press releases and statements by the djb, available at https://www.djb.de/fokusthemen/digitale-gewalt (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[2] See also djb, Policy Paper: The Internet as an anti-feminist radicalisation machine, 9 September 2021, https://www.djb.de/fileadmin/user_upload/presse/stellungnahmen/st21-18_Antifeminismus_im_Netz.pdf (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[3]Federal Criminal Police Office, Federal Situation Reports – Gender-specific crimes against women 2024, 20 January 2026, p. 33 f.
[4]Ibid., p. 34.
[5]Federal Criminal Police Office, Results of the study on unreported crime ‘Living conditions, safety and stress in everyday life (LeSuBiA)’, Special Issue I, 10 February 2026, available at https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2026/02/lesubia.html (last accessed on 25 February 2026), p. 101.
[6] Directive 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating violence against women and domestic violence, OJ L.2024/1385, 24 May 2024.
[7] Federal Criminal Police Office, Federal Situation Reports – Gender-specific crimes against women 2024, 20 January 2026, p. 32.
[8] Image-based sexual violence includes phenomena such as digital voyeurism, i.e. the recording of nude images or sexually related image content using spy cams, for example, as well as upskirting and downblousing (secretly taking photographs under a skirt or down a neckline), sextortion and thus the threat of making intimate or sexualised recordings available to third parties. This also includes the sharing of consensually produced intimate or sexualised recordings without the consent of the person depicted, as well as AI-generated recordings (so-called deep fakes); cf. McGlynn/Rackley, Image-Based Sexual Abuse, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 37:3 (2017) 534, 534; djb, Policy Paper: Combating Image-Based Sexual Violence, 7 June 2023, https://www.djb.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/detail/st23-17 (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[9] Elon Musk's platform X's AI chatbot Grok has caused quite a stir recently; Frankfurter Allgemeine, Musk's AI still generates sexualised images, 3 February 2026, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien-und-film/medienpolitik/grok-erzeugt-weiter-sexualisierte-bilder-200502477.html (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[10]Amnesty International, Amnesty reveals alarming impact of online abuse against women, 2019, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/11/amnesty-reveals-alarming-impact-of-online-abuse-against-women (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[11] Federal Criminal Police Office, Federal Situation Reports – Gender-specific crimes against women 2024, 20 January 2026, p. 32.
[12] See also GREVIO, General Recommendation No. 1 on the digital dimension of violence against women, GREVIO(2021)20, 2021.
[13] Federal Criminal Police Office, Federal Situation Reports – Gender-specific crimes against women 2024, 20 January 2026, p. 34.
[14] For an overview, see UN Women, The Manosphere – HeForShe as a Feminist Counterpoint, October 2025, https://unwomen.de/heforshe-themen-manosphaere/ (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[15] For more on this issue, see also djb, Policy Paper: The Internet as an Anti-Feminist Radicalisation Machine, 9 September 2021, https://www.djb.de/fileadmin/user_upload/presse/stellungnahmen/st21-18_Antifeminismus_im_Netz.pdf (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[16] Ibid.
[17] Convention on the Elimination of the Discrimination against Women, U.N.T.S. Vol. 1249 (1979), S. 13, BGBl. 1985 II Nr. 17, 647.
[18] CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against Women (1992), A/47/38, Rn. 6.
[19] CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19 (26 July 2017), UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/35, para. 20.
[20] Ebd., para. 21.
[21] Art. 2(e) CEDAW; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19 (26 July 2017), UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/35, para. 24.
[22] CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 33 on women’s access to justice (3 August 2015), UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/33, Rn. 25.
[23] United Nations Convention against Cybercrime; Strengthening International Cooperation for Combating Certain Crimes Committed by Means of Information and Communications Technology Systems and for the Sharing of Evidence in Electronic Form of Serious Crimes, in United Nations (UN) General Assembly, Resolution 79/243 (24 Dezember 2024), UN Doc. A/RES/79/243.
[24] The European Union (EU) has signed the Convention and recommended that Member States follow suit, see Council of the European Union, Council Decision (EU) 2025/2307 of 13 October 2025 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the United Nations Convention on Cybercrime, OJ L 2025/2307 (11.11.2025) Recital (20). However, Germany has not yet complied with this recommendation.
[25] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 005, 03.09.1953, BGBl. II 1952, 685.
[26] First instance ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, No. 5856/72, 1978.
[27]For an overview, see ECtHR, Guide to the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights Data protection, (as of 31 August 2025), ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[28]For details, see Stoyanova, Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights: Within and Beyond Boundaries, 2023.
[29]With regard to the digital space, this obligation may also be violated if the legislator remains inactive and fails to enact adequate laws. This includes, for example, the criminalisation of filming minors, ECtHR, Söderman v. Sweden, No. 5786/08, 2013, para. 117, or the obligation of internet providers to identify offensive advertising on dating platforms aimed at minors, ECtHR, K.U. v. Finland, No. 2872/02, 2008, para. 49.
[30]ECtHR, X et al. v. Bulgaria, Grand Chamber, No. 22457/16, 2021, para. 178; ECtHR, Botoyan v. Armenia, No. 5766/17, 2022, para. 91 ff.
[31]ECtHR, Volodina v. Russia, No. 40419/19, 2021.
[32]ECHR, M.Ș.D. v. Romania, No. 28935/21, 2024, para. 158.
[33]Ebd., paras. 118-120.
[34] Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, U.N.T.S. Vol. 3010 (2014), S. 107, BGBl. 2017 II, S. 1026 f., 2018 II, S. 119.
[35] See preamble to the Istanbul Convention.
[36] For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘violence against women’ is understood as a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against women and refers to all acts of gender-based violence that result in or are likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether in public or private life, Art. 3 lit. a Istanbul Convention.
[37] Art. 4(2), Art. 5 ff., Art. 12 ff., Art. 18 ff., Art. 49 ff. of the Istanbul Convention.
[38] Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, paras. 57-60. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, paras. 57-60.
[39] GREVIO, General Recommendation No. 1 on the digital dimension of violence against women, GREVIO(2021)20, 2021, paras. 42-44.
[40] Ibid., para. 32.
[41] Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, para. 106-109.
[42] GREVIO, General Recommendation No. 1 on the digital dimension of violence against women, GREVIO(2021)20, 2021, para. 57.
[43] Directive (EU) 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence, OJ L 2024/1385, 24 May 2024 (hereinafter referred to as the EU Protection Against Violence Directive).
[44] Recital (41) EU Protection Directive.
[45] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1.
[46] ECJ, judgment of 2 December 2025 – C-492/23, Russmedia Digital and Inform Media Press, ECLI:EU:C:2025:935.
[47] djb, Policy Paper: Combating Image-Based Sexual Violence, 7 June 2023, https://www.djb.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/detail/st23-17 (last accessed on 25 February 2026), p. 10.
[48] See also the demands of the djb, Policy Paper: The Internet as an anti-feminist radicalisation machine, 9 September 2021, https://www.djb.de/fileadmin/user_upload/presse/stellungnahmen/st21-18_Antifeminismus_im_Netz.pdf p. 9 ff.; djb, Policy Paper: Combating Image-Based Sexualised Violence, 7 June 2023, https://www.djb.de/fileadmin/user_upload/presse/stellungnahmen/st23-17_Bildbasierte_Gewalt.pdf , p. 4 ff.; djb, Policy Paper: Sexualised Violence – Protection Gaps and Reform Needs, 18 November 2024, https://www.djb.de/fileadmin/user_upload/presse/stellungnahmen/st24-39_Sexualisierte_Gewalt.pdf (last accessed on 25 February 2026) p. 9 ff.
[49] djb, Policy Paper: Combating Image-Based Sexualised Violence, 7 June 2023, https://www.djb.de/fileadmin/user_upload/presse/stellungnahmen/st23-17_Bildbasierte_Gewalt.pdf (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[50] djb, Policy Paper: Sexualised Violence – Protection Gaps and Reform Needs, 18 November 2024, https://www.djb.de/fileadmin/user_upload/presse/stellungnahmen/st24-39_Sexualisierte_Gewalt.pdf (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[51] djb, Policy Paper: Combating Image-Based Sexual Violence, 7 June 2023, https://www.djb.de/fileadmin/user_upload/presse/stellungnahmen/st23-17_Bildbasierte_Gewalt.pdf (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[53] Detailed information GGF, Key points of the Society for Civil Rights on the Digital Violence Protection Act – With Justice Against Digital Violence, December 2022, available at: https://freiheitsrechte.org/uploads/documents/Demokratie/Marie-Munk-Initiative/Eckpunkte-Marie-Munk-Initiative.pdf (last accessed on 26 February 2026).
[54] See also djb, Policy Paper: The Internet as an Anti-Feminist Radicalisation Machine, 9 September 2021, https://www.djb.de/fileadmin/user_upload/presse/stellungnahmen/st21-18_Antifeminismus_im_Netz.pdf (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[55] See also djb, Policy Paper: Bekämpfung bildbasierter sexualisierter Gewalt (Combating image-based sexualised violence), 7 June 2023, https://www.djb.de/fileadmin/user_upload/presse/stellungnahmen/st23-17_Bildbasierte_Gewalt.pdf (last accessed on 25 February 2026).
[56] Istanbul Convention Alliance, Alternative Report on the Implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, September 2025 (hereinafter referred to as BIK, Alternative Report Istanbul Convention) p. 29.
[57] German Institute for Human Rights, Monitor Violence against Women. Implementation of the Istanbul Convention in Germany. First Periodic Report, December 2024, p. 354.
[58] BIK, Alternative Report Istanbul Convention, p. 29.
[59] GREVIO, General Recommendation No. 1 on the digital dimension of violence against women, GREVIO(2021)20, 2021.
[60] BIK, Alternative Report on the Istanbul Convention, p. 30.
[61] Ibid., p. 37.
